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I.

Introduction
A.

In the settlement of the West, water was important for domestic uses,
mining, and agriculture.

B.

Over the last few decades, other values are being recognized in
water; and the prior appropriation doctrine is adapting accordingly.

C.

1.

Hydropower

2.

Fish and wildlife

3.

Water quality

4.

Recreation

These changes have not come without problems and controversy.
One area where controversy has been particularly volatile concerns
public access to surface waters.
1.

On the one hand are growing demands to use these waters
for recreational purposes. Water-based recreation is an
important and growing sector in the economies of our
western states.

2.

On the other hand are the expectations of many water users
that certain of these waters (especially "nonnavigable" lakes
and streams) are private.

D.

Prof. Richard Hildreth has discussed public access in coastal
setting. "Public Access to Shorelines and Beaches," supra.

E.

This presentation examines the same issue as it pertains to inland
rivers, streams, and lakes.

II. The distinction between navigable and nonnavigable waters
A.

Importance of distinction: Navigable waters have been long
recognized as available for public use. Nonnavigable waters have
not.

B.

Origins of the distinction.
1.

Origins explain emphasis on navigability:
a.

"[T]he common law of inland waterways has been
dependent upon doctrines which came from the law
concerning coastal waters, and coastal waters, in turn,
owe their debt to the law of the sea itself." Stone,

Waters and Water Rights § 37.1, at 202 (R.E. Clark ed.
1967).
b.

Until recent years, public has not made sufficient
demand for use of inland waters other than for
commercial purposes. Id. at 203.

2.

Navigability in American law first defined in context of
admiralty jurisdiction. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825)(jurisdiction extended only
"upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the
tide").

3.

Navigability concept modified to extend admiralty jurisdiction
to Great Lakes. The Propellor Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851)("there can be no reason
for admiralty power over a public tidewater, which does not
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apply with equal force to any other public water used for
commercial purposes and foreign trade").
4.

In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the 13 original states, rather
than the federal government, succeeded to the British
Crown's title to tidelands and the foreshore.

5.

In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the equal footing
doctrine, each new state also took title to the streambeds of
navigable waters.

6.

In The Daniel Bell, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that navigable waters are those
"used or.... susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted ...." Id. at 563.

III.

Modifications of the "navigability-nonnavigability" distinction
A.

Development of "recreational use" test
1.

Courts have modified the meaning of navigability to include
public recreational uses.

2.

People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040,97 Cal. Rptr. 448

(1971)("[T]he real question here is not of title but whether the
public has the right of fishing and navigation").
3.

Kelley ex reL MacMullen v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 214

N.W.2d 856 (1974)("[R]ecreational uses alone can support a
finding of navigability").

4.

State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d 659 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980)(calling the commercially based

navigability test a "remnant of the steamboat era").
5.

Legislatures have also passed "angling statutes" authorizing
fishing on navigable streams. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 87-2-305 (1985).

B.

Development of public easement theory
1.

State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421

(1945)("[T]he waters in question were, and are, public waters
... The right of the public, the state, to enjoy the use of the
public waters in question cannot be foreclosed. . . .").
2.

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961)("The title to

waters within the State being in the State, ... there must be
an easement on behalf of the State for a right of way through
their natural channels .... The waters ... are available for
such uses by the public of which they are capable").
3.

Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'll v. Picabo Livestock Co.,

96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974)("[T]itle to all water in
Silver Creek belongs to the State of Idaho, ... [and] there is
an easement in the state on behalf of the public for a right of
way through the natural channels of [the creek]").
4.

But see People v. Emmert, 198 Cob. 137, 597 P.2d 1025

(1979)(rafters properly convicted of criminal trespass when
they floated nonnavigable river crossing private land). The
Colorado attorney general has attempted to limit this holding
by an opinion that a trespass does not occur if the bank or
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beds of a stream are not touched. Cob. Att'y Gen. slip op.
(Aug., 31, 1983).
IV. The Montana case study
A.

Montana is excellent case study of the controversies that surround
efforts to increase public use of nonnavigable waters.

B.

Early decision prohibited fishing in waters over a privately owned
streambed . Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 596, 241 P. 328
(1925).

C.

During 1971-72 Constitutional Convention, delegates considered
but rejected proposals to recognize the public trust in the
environment and natural resources of the state. Proposal 12, 1
MONT. CONST. CONV. 308-09; Proposal 162, 2 MONT. CONT.
CONV. 555.

D.

While not adopting explicit public trust provisions, Montanans did
ratify a constitution recognizing the broad public interest in its
waters: "All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters
within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for
the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial
uses as provided by law." MONT. CONST. art. IX, §3(3).

E.

Somewhat isolated controversies between certain landowners
and recreationists on the Dearborn and Beaverhead Rivers
developed into statewide controversy.
1.

Montana Supreme Court adopted and broadly applied
provisions of public trust doctrine, as well as provisions of
state constitution. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Curran,

Mont.

682 P.2d 163 (1984); Montana
6

Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth,

Mont. , 684

P.2d 1088 (1984).
a.

Court adopts a recreational use test not linked to
streambed ownership: " The capacity of use of the
waters for recreational purposes determines their
availability for recreational use by the public.
Streambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant.
If the waters are owned by the State and held in trust
for the people by the State, no private party may bar
the use of those waters by the people."

Mont. at

, 682 P.2d at 170.
b.

Public has right to use state-owned waters up to the
high water mark. Id. at_, 682 P.2d at 172.

c.

Public is allowed to portage around barriers in water
by entering private property is the least obtrusive
way. Id.

d.

Unequivocal statement that public does not have any
right, other than portage, to enter private property.

hi
2.

Legislative "clarification" of supreme court decision. MONT.
CODE. ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1985)("stream access
law").
a.

The act classifies rivers and streams (not lakes).
(1)

Class I - waters navigable under traditional
title or commercial use tests

b.

(2)
Class II - all other waters
The act imposes limitations on use of surface waters.

(1)

For all rivers and streams, public use does not
include all-terrain vehicles, big game hunting
except by bow or shotgun, overnight camping
within 500 yards or the site of an occupied
dwelling, or passage when the bed is dry.

(2)

Additionally for Class II waters, public use
does not include big game hunting, overnight
camping, or any activity which is not primarily
a water-related pleasure activity.

c.

The act authorizes the fish,wildlife, and parks
commission to restrict public access on Class II
waters not capable of sustaining recreational use.

d.

The act provides a procedure for county officials,
upon request, to determine portage routes.

3. The controversy extends into another round of litigation. Galt
v. Montana, 44 St. Rep. 103 (Jan. 15, 1987).

a.

Supreme court holds that "any use of the bed and
banks must be of minimal impact." Court adopts a
public easement approach and holds that the
easement "must be narrowly confined so that impact
to beds and banks owned by private individuals is
minimal." Id. at 107.

b.

Court also holds that statute is overbroad in allowing
uses that are not necessary for the public's
enjoyment of water (e.g., overnight camping or
placement of duck blinds on banks).

c.

Court holds that requiring landowner to bear cost of
constructing portage routes is unconstitutional.

4.

The controversy extends into another round of legislation.
S.B. 159 (Boylan), S.B. 286 (Galt), 50th Mont. Leg. Sess.
(1987).

5.

The controversy extends into a third round of litigation.
Landowners file suits for refund of taxes paid on stream
beds and banks now available for public use.

V. Development of a new approach for identifying and determining publicly
important surface waters
A.

The traditional tests based on concepts of navigability were
sufficient for an earlier time when the public interest in waters was
based on their contributions to commerce.

B.

The "recreational use" test used by the courts in Day, Curran, and

Hildreth updates the earlier test. The "recreational use" test,
however, still does not focus the attention of decisionmakers on
what really is at issue.
C.

"Navigability" and "recreational use" are only imperfect proxies of
certain public interests in surface waters. The challenge is to
develop a new decision rule which more directly identifies and
compares the public and private interests in certain surface
waters. The public interest needs to be defined broadly to include
recreation, aesthetics, the preservation of habitat, flows sufficient
to protect fish and other water-dependent species, water quality,
etc.
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D.

Certain factors should be explicitly identified and considered in
determining whether a particular stream or lake is to be available
for public use:
1.

The customs and traditions of use of a particular
waterway that have developed over time. See Sax,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (1980) ("settled
expectations").

2.

The extent of water appropriation including the amount of

3.

consumptive use and return flows.
The nature and importance of wildlife and habitat on any
stream segment or lake front.

4.

5.

The demand being made for greater public use
a.

The extent of possible commercial activity

b.

The extent of possible noncommercial activity

The extent to which the state or local economy might be
served by greater public use.

6.

The burdens that would result to adjoining landowners from
greater public use.

E.

After consideration of these and other factors, the responsible
state agency would determine
1.

Whether a particular waterway should be designated
"public"

2.

What type of public designation should be made?
Because of their dominant recreational potential,
a.
certain waterways would be opened to those uses.
b.

Because of their importance for wildlife values,
certain waterways would be declared "public"; but
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public access would be denied or conditioned as a
means to preserve those values.
c.

Other "public use" categories and conditions would
be developed.

F.

What is being proposed is a planning or zoning system for
surface waters and their attendant beds and banks. See Abrams,
Governmental Expansion of Recreational Water Use
Opportunities, 59 OR. L. REV. 159 (1980) for excellent
development of similar approach.
1.

It is similar to the state wild and scenic river designation
programs used by such states as California, New Mexico,
Oregon, and the Dakotas. See., e.g., CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 5093.50 -.69 (West 1984).

2.

It is also similar to the water reservation systems used by
Montana, Alaska, and the Dakotas. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1)(1985).

3.

It would also protect some of the same values sought to be
protected under instream flow programs. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-102.

G.

What the prior appropriation doctrine and all these programs lack,
however, is the ability to integrally manage all the values attendant
to a waterway. A planning-zoning approach, for all its limitations,
offers an improved means of achieving integrated water
management.
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VI.

Problems of a planning or zoning-type approach to identifying and
determining publicly important surface waters
A.

The chief weakness (and greatest strength) of this method is that it
requires the application of general principles and the balancing
of public and private interests on a case-by-case basis.

B.

The magnitude of an effort to review and categorize all surface
waters of a state could well be an over-whelming task. Yet, most
of the conflicts occur on a relatively few number of streams and
lakes. If, however, a petition were required from a landowner,
member of the public, or state agency to initiate the process,
decisionmaking resources could be prioritized.

C.

Many landowners and water users will resist what they see as
another needless intrusion of government agencies.

D.

Whether compensation will need to be paid
At what point will a zoning approach result in the taking of
1.
private property without compensation?
2.

U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the payment
of damages is required in the case of a taking or whether
invalidation of the governmental action, as in excess of the
police power, is an appropriate remedy.

3.

The U.S. Supreme Court has before it this term three cases
which raise the taking issue.
a.

No/Ian v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 86-133

[lower court decision at 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (2d Dist.
1986)]. In this case, the petitioners wanted to tear
down an old house and build a new house on beach
front property. The California Coastal Commission
12

required that the petitioners give public access
across the propei4y-te-t4e-beach.

b.

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, No. 85-1199. The church's retreat center
was destroyed by a flood in 1978. A county
ordinance was passed to prevent building in that
area due to the dangers of flood. The church claims
money damages; but under state law, they are
entitled only to declaratory relief or mandamus to
invalidate the ordinance.

c.

The third case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.

DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (Mar. 9, 1987), has
already been decided by the Court.
4.

Keystone is a good analogy to the situation presented
by public use of surface waters overlying private lands.
a.

In a famous decision by Justice Holmes, the Court
held in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting
mining under certain structures constituted an
unconstitutional taking.

b.

Sixty-five years later, the Court in Keystone upholds
a very similar Pennsylvania statute. The difference,
however, is that the statute is now embellished with
explicit statements by the legislature as to the public
interests that are served by the prohibition:
conservation of surface lands, safety, enhancement
of taxable value, water preservation, and "generally
13

to improve the use and enjoyment of such lands." 55
U.S.L.W. at 4330.
c.

One important basis for the Court's decision in
Keystone is the difficulty of the coal company in

demonstrating financial harm. The Court quotes
approvingly from its decision in Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51(1979): "'[W]here an owner possesses a full
"bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one
"strand" of the bundle is not a taking because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.'" 55
U.S.L.W. at 4334.
c.

The zoning of publicly important waterways is more
like Keystone than Pennsylvania Coal.

5.

Another case to watch is Anyoshi v. Robinson, 753 F.2d
1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986), now
pending, No. 85-5999 (9th Cir.), which involves a

condemnation claim arising out of Hawaii's change of its
water rights system in 1973. As a result, certain water rights
which had been established as early as 1931 are no longer
recognized by the state. A Ninth Circuit decision in favor of
the water rigthts claimants has been vacated by the U.S.
Supreme Court and ordered to be reexamined in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Williamson Co. Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108

(1985).
6.

See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164

(1979)(when owners of private nonnavigable pond
14

connected it to navigable bay, government could not open
pond to public without payment of compensation); Loving v.
Alexander, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984)(U.S. Army Corps'
determination that portion of river was navigable, contrary to
belief of land owners, did not constitute a taking).
E.

Mitigating the effects on private landowners
1.

It is ironic that the present movement of western water is to
allow water users to profit from the sale or lease of water
that is described as publicly or state-owned in many state
constitutions. Yet, at the same time, compensation may not
be available when the public uses the private land under or
adjoining many lakes and streams.

2.

While increasing public use of waterways may not result in
compensable injuries, there are equitable and public policy
reasons for mitigating the effects of this transition.

3.

State and local governments should acquire and develop
more access and camping sites.

4.

State and local governments will have to provide adequate
law enforcement to ensure that the rights of upland
landowners are respected.

5.

State and local governments should provide financial
assistance to needy landowners for fencing where needed,
posting, and the construction of portage routes.

VII.

Conclusion
A.

Public access cases are difficult challenges in balancing public
and private interests.
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B.

In addition to these public and private interests, there is the
integrity and need of the water resource itself. It no longer makes
much sense to management the water rights regime separately
from the land through which these waters run or from the wildlife
which depend on these waters.

C.

The need is for integrated management of the lakes and streams
in the western states.

D.

Hopefully, traditional legal regimes will prove sufficiently flexible to
make this accommodation. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Parks v.
Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974)

(state appropriation of certain waters for scenic beauty and
recreational purposes).
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